Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court’s infamous decision legalizing abortion, was the Pearl Harbor of America’s culture war. It is now clear that a majority of the justices were determined to legalize abortion, and their challenge was to find some constitutional argument in support.
In the end, the justices simply invented a new right to privacy that was extended to abortion, even as they admitted that this right is not even mentioned in the Constitution. The majority made fetal viability–the moment when the fetus can live outside the mother–as the mark when the state can outlaw abortion. In 1973, that mark was in the third trimester; now, it is well within the second trimester. And further medical advances like an artificial womb may mean that the fetus is viable from the moment of conception.
When that happens, the logic of Roe collapses. That’s good news–not only for the fetus, but for all of us.
Note 48. Phil writes:
Well, this “extreme conservative” wants to make sure that the pronoun “we” refers to the category of homo sapiens which is comprised of individuals either male or female. You, however, are male. I am male. No one person is both male and female.
Essentially, you are arguing that homosexual marriage should be limited to one partner because that is how we practice traditional heterosexual marriage, correct? And the reason homosexual couplings ought to be granted the legal benefits of heterosexual marriage is because a man who wants to marry a man does not have the same rights as a woman (to marry a man), correct?
Then aren’t you collapsing the distinction between male and female? And in so doing, are you not undermining the same tradition that you say justifies homosexual marriage?
In other words, you invoke the authority of the tradition to argue that homosexual marriages should be limited to only two people, yet you discard the tradition when it restricts monogamous marriage to the opposite sex. (Note how even you find it necessary to move beyond legal categories to defend your position.)
But, if discrimination is the reason why the prohibition against homosexual marriage should be discarded, then there is nothing to stop polyamoris couples (heterosexual or homosexual) from making the same claim. How? Just classify polyamory as an orientation so that polyamorists can claim special status as a victim group. Then, the definition you provided . . .
. . . works as well for them as it does homosexuals.
Check out: The Marriage Trap: A new book wrestles with monogamy and its modern discontents.
How about women can bear children and men cannot?
Here, though, is where the argument gets silly, and where I contend you lack of experience is a handicap. Again, anyone, even the most ardent feminist if she has a thread of honesty, will see differences in little boys and little girls, and will discover that these differences lie deeper than the level of socialization that she learned about in college. You just won’t persuade most parents that gender is merely a social construct. They know better. Like it or not, girls like Barbies, and boys like trucks.
Note 47. You rescue the lab tech because as a more fully developed human being, her death would have a greater impact than the death of the embryo. Don’t take this a principle though (as you philosphers are wont to do). It’s a judgement call. Other situations might call for different responses, or at least different reasons for the responses.
Fr.Hans writes: “You rescue the lab tech because as a more fully developed human being, her death would have a greater impact than the death of the embryo.”
No, I’d rescue the lab tech because it would be the morally right thing to do. You are suggesting a utilitarian motive. But that would not be my motive, nor, I think would it be the motive of most people.
Fr. Hans: “Don’t take this a principle though (as you philosphers are wont to do).”
I don’t know if it’s a principle, but we can learn from philosophical examples, even from fictional examples. That’s basically what a parable is: “A story involving plausible characters and situations meant to illustrate a moral point.”
Fr. Hans: “It’s a judgement call. Other situations might call for different responses, or at least different reasons for the responses.”
Yes, and that’s what situational ethics all about. We look at the relevant facts and details of the situation in order to decide what the right action is. This is exactly why I support the right of a woman to choose abortion in the early stages of pregnancy.
Note 51-
You make the mistake of extrapolating from the majority to the entirety of a population.
The majority of women can bear children. If “ability to bear children” is the magical quality that you believe makes a woman an important part of a two-person romantic relationship, then you’d have to invalidate millions of those relationships.
I somehow doubt that when a couple comes to you and reveals that the female partner is infertile you advise: “Leave her, because she can’t bear children.”
It’s not true to say that all women can bear children. It’s not true to say that all women have ovaries, or that all women have breasts. It’s not true to say that all women are nurturing, or that all women are pretty, or that all women scream when they see a mouse.
You act as if, by saying those things, I’m also making the reverse claims: No women can bear children; no women scream when they see a mouse. But I’m not. I’ll concede that plenty of women display these feminine characteristics.
You talk as if permitting two women to marry is the same as forcing all couples to forego heterosexual relations. If you see a same-sex couple as “gender confused,” then by all means, marry someone of the opposite sex! There’s no need for “parents to believe that gender is a social construct.” There’s no need for anyone to change their mind about whether “gender differences lie deeper than the level of…socialization” learned in college. Those are straw men. I don’t need to support the notion that gender doesn’t matter, because it does. Gender is an important and complex component of the human experience.
My argument doesn’t require me to take some weird postmodern neoliberal extremist stance on gender. I can concede that all of your stereotypes or characteristics of gender are true for the majority of all males and females, and I’m still morally, ethically, and legally consistent when I say that a man should have the same right to marry a man as a woman does. I would only need to take on the burden of proof that you keep trying to impose on me if I were saying that every man has the obligation to marry a man. But that would be silly. Of course the vast majority of marriages in America, after same-sex marriage becomes legal, will still be heterosexual. I don’t need to be married to your wife and raising your children to realize that.
Your argument, on the other hand, requires you to put forth that gender is supremely important in the the makeup of a committed, state-supported romantic relationship. But you can’t defend that argument because you can’t come up with a definition of “female” or “male” that encompasses every single female or male.
I can’t tell if you really think that I’ve been arguing all along that homosexuals should have special status as a victim group, or if you’re just intentionally presenting a straw man because talking about polygamy lets you take on a “the sky is falling” tone. But read my previous posts about SSM; I never suggested that one person should have a right that someone else doesn’t have.
I’m not contending that there are no differences between boys and girls. Rather, you’re contending that all boys are the same and all girls are the same. (Or, more accurately, you’re suggesting that there is some magical quality that all women possess that no man possesses, and vice versa.)
Actually, the differences between little boys and little girls are profound, and so are the differences within cohort groups like boys and girls.
It would be accurate to say that “the majority of girls like Barbies, and the majority of boys like trucks.”
Some girls like trucks, and some boys like Barbies. You’d be a fool to pretend that isn’t the case. Similarly, some girls like girls. (I’m not saying that all girls who like trucks also like girls, although perhaps there’s a correlation we’ll discover someday.)
You purport to know what is best for all persons. All I’m suggesting is that an individual person is much more qualified than you or the government to determine how important the sex of their partner is to them.
Note 53. Jim writes:
No, I’m not suggesting a utilitarian motive at all, at least as an abstract principle (that’s why I mentioned don’t try to abstract a principle from this). And, yes, it is the right thing to do, but you question suggested you wanted a reason why it would be right.
Well, OK, but if the only criteria on who lives and who dies is that some situations call for different responses, it gets a bit weak. What about the Boxer position that abortions are allowed up to three seconds before birth, or the Singer position that post-birth abortions can continue up to three years?
Fr. Hans writes: “Well, OK, but if the only criteria on who lives and who dies is that some situations call for different responses, it gets a bit weak. What about the Boxer position that abortions are allowed up to three seconds before birth, or the Singer position that post-birth abortions can continue up to three years?”
As I see it, your frequent approach to morality is this: you want to have moral principles that completely and unambiguously, for all time, nail down moral issues so that there are no slippery slopes, and the door that leads to other moral possibilities cannot even be opened a crack. Because once that door opens, you never know what might come through it. (Interestingly, you don’t take that approach when it comes to the morality of war. In fact, you grease the hinges on that door.)
But with Schiavo, physician-assisted suicide, gay marriage, and abortion, your standard template is “but if we allow that, then [fill in the blank] can happen.” For you, morality is all about building a wall around a situation so that Kervorkian, Singer, Hitler, Stalin, and NAMBLA are forever on the outside. (This may sound harsh, and I don’t mean it to be, but I think for you Christianity is less of a religion and more of a system of support beams that keep that wall in place; remove the support beams and the wall can crumble. I think for you it’s not so much that Christianity is true, but that it’s necessary.)
There are a couple of problems with this approach. First, it doesn’t work. Hitler & Co. can always find a way in. The extreme view is always a threat. The moral bulwark can be breached in an instant, religion can be perverted, and Abu Ghraib can appear in our midst without warning, celebrated and cheered on even by those who claim to be the keepers of morality. The only thing that can keep the extreme views at bay is the moral concensus. Lose the moral concensus and it’s all over. But the moral concensus is something that has to be continually strengthened and refreshed. There is no once-and-forever moral principle that can replace it or guarantee it.
Second, we need an approach to morality that allows us to respond to the intricacies and subtleties of particular moral situations. A morality that is obsessed with the slippery slope cannot do that. One of the consequences of the morality I’m suggesting is that we will face difficult situations, and sometimes the moral path will not be clear. Sometimes we may make the wrong decision, and all of the time we will have to be on the lookout for Hitler and Kervorkian, since there is no moral wall that will automatically protect us.
Note 56. It’s not so much about building a wall as pointing out that the moral justifications for abortion, euthanasia, and infanticide are not consistent except in their deconstruction of the moral tradition. I’ve pointed this out numerous times. You advocate abortion in the first trimester for a host of reasons. Barbara Boxer advocates abortion up to one second before the child emerges from the birth canal. Peter Singer advocates post-birth abortions up to three years old.
There is nothing in you moral reasoning that would prohibit a partial birth abortion or, if pushed, a post-birth abortion. You might find both practices distasteful, perhaps even repugnant, but the reasoning that morally justifies a first trimester abortion is the same that justifies the other two. Once human life is arbitrarily valued, nothing stops the dehumanization that might, and given the right circumstances will, occur.
The barbarians are always at the gate. But don’t think that these things cannot be stopped. Historians question why the barbarity of the French Revolution never jumped the English Channel. Rousseau was a popular there in circles, economic deprivation was extreme, the political climate was not stable, in short English culture was not far removed from French culture. What stopped it? Most likely the English Great Awakening, particularly the work of John Wesley.
Further, events like Abu Ghraib are condemned, not endorsed (although I contend the pornographic nature of the abuses tells us something about the decline of American culture). Sometimes the abuses last for several centuries such as slavery. But the difference is that these abuses are recognized for what they are, even if it takes a while; a recognition that can only occur if moral standards are clear.
So when you write…
… you are merely repeating what is self-evidently true in sociological terms, but saying nothing about the ideas, beliefs, attitudes, etc. that comprise that consensus. Yes, the consensus changes, but it does not change without people changing it. Look at Civil Rights for example. Do you believe segregation would have ended without the efforts of Martin Luther King? Do you really that King would have been successful apart from his appeal to the moral conscience of the nation? I don’t.
Well, sure. But you will not be able to provide the argument against a Hitler or Kervorkian. You can’t provide one against Boxer, not with any authority anyway. She will argue that your placement of value at the first trimester is arbitrary, which it is. Your position might appear more humane than hers, but only because it appeals to a tradition that values all human life, not just from the second trimester forward. When challenging her however, she will respond with the condescension that envelops the rebellious cry of all who hate authority: “Who are you to tell me what to do!” And, given your arbitrary view, she’s right.
Not every German was a Nazi. Stories abound of the villagers of Dachau who secretly knew of the barbaric inhumanity behind the barb wire outside the village, but were either too confused or to cowardly to raise their voice against it. All it takes to create this confusion is the claim no real standards about human value exist. All is relative. What is true for you might not be true for me, but it doesn’t matter because there is no such thing as truth anyway. You might not believe this, and frankly I don’t think you do. But your voice is just another in the great cacophony that reaches all the way to Peter Singer and thus contributes to the confusion.
Edmund Burke was right: all it takes for evil to prevail is for good men to do nothing.
Sometimes you have to build walls around behaviors. This is what the law attempts to do through its coercive authority. Sometimes it succeeds. Other times people still break the law.
But even the law depends on a shared moral consensus and ultimately the consensus shifts according to conscience. It’s often a messy and fractious process, but it can succeed as the Civil Rights Movement makes clear in our generation, or abolition in another, the beating back of the Eugenics movement in the early twentieth century, etc. Abortion is the issue facing us and the victory over a pro-choice society will be achieved only when the consciences of more people are awakened, which it appears is happening. There will always be abortions. There will always be hard cases. But these will be mourned, not celebrated.
Read Robert P. George’s piece in the latest National Review. It’s not on the newsstands yet I think (I got an early copy), but make a point of reading it when it comes out.
Note 54. Phil writes:
Not quite. My argument is that gender is supremely important in the makeup of a family, and because it is in the best interest of society to foster stable families, marriage should be restricted to heterosexual monogamy.
Look, you argue that you view is restricted only to homosexual monogamy. Fine, argue away. But your reasoning is exactly the same as the polymorist’s. It frustrates you that I point this out, but you are not the only making arguments in this debate. There is nothing in your view that can’t be applied to anyone who wants to call their relationship a marriage.
Well, again, judging by the last election there’s a boatload more than me that are not persuaded by the arguments you offered. (BTW, the government or me does not decide the sex of your partner. You get to do that.)
Do you really think that? You really think that saying “it is wrong to prohibit your marriage because of one trait of your partner” is the same reasoning as “it is wrong to prohibit a marriage because of the number of partners you want to marry?”
Didn’t miscegenationists have the same logic? Why didn’t their win lead to instant polygamy?
Or–is it possible that polygamy will be the longterm effect of their win, in which case, we should never have permitted interracial marriage?
Note 59. Phil writes:
To accept your question, I first have to accept the premise that gender is nothing more than a personality trait. But we’ve been through this before. Like it or not, there are substantial differences between male and female starting from the plumbing forward.
So I would answer no, it is not the same reasoning, but for different reasons you implicitly put forward.
Because miscegenation was understood as marriage between one male and female.
If the miscegenationists advocated for interracial homosexual marriage, you might have a point although once made, homosexuality, and not the interracial element, would become the focus and we end up back at your first question.
No one said it’s a personality trait. A “trait” is simply a quality or characteristic; in this case “a genetic trait” would work just as well, but of course it would also be arbitrary to deny marriage based on a personality trait, so there isn’t a valid reason to limit the claim to only genetic traits.
I think I’m beginning to see your reasoning. I haven’t made any arguments that support polygamy, but I haven’t made any arguments that preclude it, either. I don’t think you see much of a distinction between “failure to condemn” and “support.”
That is, if I’m really saying, “The government should treat all of its citizens equally,” then if the government provided three-person marriage, nothing in my claim would correct that. Instead, the logical extension of my argument would be “the government should provide three-person marriage for all citizens.”
If you take a stance of “the government should never modify or alter marriage laws” then you are automatically also taking a stance against polygamy.
The slippery-slope fallacy that you employ is that there isn’t a logical leap between “treat all citizens equally” and “give all citizens what they want.” What you’re basically saying is “introducing the concept of change is volatile and will allow other laws to pass, because it doesn’t not allow other laws to pass.”
But that’s like saying “If we free first-time drug offenders from prison, then that will lead to freeing rapists and serial killers.” The only commonality between the two things that you’re linking are the abstract notion that we can change the law of the land.
But “failure to condemn” and “support” are not the same thing.
Some high schools recognize the “top ten” students. It’s a distinction that gets their photo in the paper and is a line on their transcripts. In (what I would call) less enlightened times, some schools defined their “top ten” as the top five girls and the top five boys. So a boy or girl could be sixth in their class, but not recognized as being in the top ten because of their gender.
Of course they didn’t have the “top five whites” and the “top five blacks” at this time–that would be discriminatory! But gender matters.
Fortunately, most schools that engaged in this sexist practice have stopped, and they now recognize the top ten students (or the top ten percent), or what-have-you.
Now, your reasoning is that by saying we should allow students to be recognized in the top ten irrespective of gender, we must also recognize the top fifteen, because they might want that too. And then we must recognize the top twenty, etc.
But it doesn’t follow. The only thing we might reasonably conclude about making a gender-neutral academic recognition policy or a gender-neutral marriage policy is that we would have to listen to the arguments of people who want to propose other changes. It doesn’t logically mean we can’t evaluate those arguments and make independent decisions.
And I’m getting that’s the impression that’s what you fear– that if we listen to one group, we must listen to others. Better to maintain the status quo, where we can ignore them all.
Note 61. Phil writes:
No. What I am arguing is that the rationale for homosexual marriage uses the same rationale that polygaymists and others use who clamor for marriage. You argue that homosexual marriage should be allowed because laws prohibiting homosexual marriage discriminate against men (women can marry men but homosexual men cannot). It’s a novel argument, but it requires the abolition of gender distinctions in any definition of what constitutes a family, which you attempt to do by reducing gender first to traits, and second to genetics. You don’t address the biological dimension at all, particularly the fact that homosexual unions are infertile by design.
The argument that homosexual marriage replicates heterosexual marriage and therefore no slippery-slope exists doesn’t work either because both are predicated on different rationales. Heterosexual marriage follows nature’s design, a natural law evident most clearly in biological and other gender distinctions. Homosexual marriage cannot claim this rationale and thus is required to reach elsewhere, in your case a legal argument based on discrimination.
In reality, there is no natural congruency between the two (in fact, in biological terms homosexual unions are radically incongruent with heterosexual unions), and your assertion that the rationale behind homosexual marriage won’t cause a spate of other claims to the right of marriage won’t hold up. After all, it’s not fair that a heterosexual man cannot have more than one wife. Would you agree?
If a homosexual wanted to marry two men that he authentically loved, do you think he should be allowed to do so? Why or why not?
Fr. Hans writes: “There is nothing in your moral reasoning that would prohibit a partial birth abortion or, if pushed, a post-birth abortion. You might find both practices distasteful, perhaps even repugnant, but the reasoning that morally justifies a first trimester abortion is the same that justifies the other two.”
In many moral situations we’re trying to strike a balance between competing moral claims.
That doesn’t mean that there aren’t moral truths, but that we try to find the extent to which various moral truths should govern the situation.
For example, in criminal cases we try to balance the right of society to punish crime and to be safe from criminals with the right of the criminal not to be overly-punished. That means that there is no one-size-fits-all principle that can be applied. The consequence of that is that we could eventually sentence jaywalkers to life in prison at hard labor. There’s nothing in the logic of punishment that would prevent that per se. What prevents that is our moral intuition that the punishment has to fit the crime. What I appeal to is that very moral intuition. Of course, we’re never going to have uniformity of opinion.
This kind of moral reasoning is what in the Catholic tradition would be called “casuistic,” or case-based reasoning. We look at the details of the case, and consider all the various factors. This is typically how most people do moral reasoning. But in EVERY instance of case-based reasoning, the slippery slope is ALWAYS possible.
In the case of abortion, what you advocate is apodictic, or absolute reasoning. You cut through the problem by prohibiting abortion in virtually every case.
The problem as I see it is that your argument against abortion is potentially an argument against ALL casustic reasoning. Yet in other life and death situations you don’t use that kind of reasoning. But there is really nothing in your abortion logic that permits case-based reasoning in any other context.
As I see it, your your challenge is twofold: first, explain how case-based reasoning is possible in any situation, and second, to explain why case-based reasoning is not permitted in the case of abortion.
Give me some more information about this polygamy that you’re proposing. It sounds like you’re onto something; perhaps you can persuade lots of people with the arguments you keep coming up with.
A few questions, to help you shape the institution you so frequently find support for:
1. Marriage in this country is seen as a contract between persons of equal standing. When you suggest that a man could have more than one wife, are you saying that the women would be married to each other as well, or that each wife would be involved in a separate marriage with the man?
2. If a man had three wives, and two of them also wanted to marry, would it be a group marriage overall, or would the status of the one wife who was only married to the man be different?
2a. Would this change their tax situation?
3. In the event of the man’s incapacitation, which wife would acquire power of attorney?
3a. Would it require a 2/3 vote of remaining wives to divorce one of their number upon the husband’s incapacitation, or a simple majority?
4. In the case of a divorce, would all of the relationships be dissolved simultaneously, or would the group marriage eject one person at a time?
5. If the husband fathers children with three different wives, in the event that one wife leaves, would she pay child support to the remaining partners if they retained custody?
5a. Would this still apply if the child in question were named “Ashley” or “Caitlynn?”
Once you can come up with reasonable answers to these questions, which, as you indicate, of course also apply to gay monogamous marriages, I think we’re good to move forward with our joint polygamy/same-sex marriage legislation.
I don’t know why I didn’t see it before, but you are right: exactly the same logic and reasoning apply to both.
Phil, you didn’t answer my question. Here it is again:
If a homosexual wanted to marry two men that he authentically loved, do you think he should be allowed to do so? Why or why not?
Fr. Hans writes: “What I am arguing is that the rationale for homosexual marriage uses the same rationale that polygaymists and others use who clamor for marriage.”
There are two relevant facts that so far have been missing from this discussion:
1) polygamy has already been tried in the U.S. and rejected. Saying that the rationale for gay marriage somehow works for polygamy is like saying that arguing that alcohol should be legal would lead to heroin being legal. We’ve been there too and rejected that. The consequences of polygamy in the U.S. — child brides, wife abuse, women treated as property and status symbols — are already well known.
2) The argument for polygamy comes not from gay marriage but from the Bible! Phil and I are not arguing for polygamy, but one could make a case that Abraham and various other famous fellows in the Bible were. You could just as easily make that case that Abraham having two wives constituted a rationale for gay marriage. But it didn’t. The argument doesn’t work in that direction, and it doesn’t work in the other direction either.
Note 63. Jim writes:
I argue that to devalue life in some cases and not others is morally incoherent. And, yes, human life has intrinsic value even in the womb, and even when a person is incapacitated.
So yes, I believe almost all abortions violate this precept. Hard cases, and there are some, are occasions of sorrow, not celebration.
Note 66. Jim writes;
Not really. The culture never sanctioned polygamy, thus attempts by polygamous fringe groups to legalize polygamy were rejected.
Wait, you convince me through the power of your persuasion that polygamy is the way to go, and then you pick the institution apart?
In answer to your question, no. In this case, “authentic love” is a red herring, since the state has no way to determine whether love is authentic or not. There’s no reason for a homosexual to be granted special rights that no other man or woman in the country has, and the state has no institution for multiple-partner marriage.
Before the state creates the institution of multiple-partner marriage, there are some procedural questions (Note 64) which, as you rightly suggest, are in no way different from the questions raised by same-sex marriage.
Note 69. Phil writes:
Ok. On what grounds then, should the state restrict marriage to only two people?
(BTW, don’t forget that all men have the right to marry. You argument is not that men don’t have the right to marry. You argument is that men don’t have the right to marry men, that is, it is discriminatory that women can marry men while men cannot marry men.)
Since the number of ways we could legally construct a multiple-partner marriage arrangement is practically limitless, the onus is on you and other pro-polygamy arguers to offer a plan that we can discuss the merits of. Something that might be a problem with one type of polygamy may not apply to another structure.
Put another way: civil marriage is not just an abstract notion, it is a particular legal contract which confers a number of automatic rights and privileges. You are asking me to oppose a law, but you haven’t presented a law.
My immediate answer, then, is “The state cannot create a legal structure for multiple-partner marriage because a number of unanswered procedural questions remain.”
You might start by answering questions 1-5 (you can skip 5a if you wish) to get the ball rolling.
Yes, and by exactly the same reasoning you present here, when interracial marriage was illegal, all white women and all black men (etc.) also had the right to marry.
So, please, either drop the ridiculous argument that all men have a right to marry or acknowledge that all “Negroes” had a right to marry in the pre-civil rights era as well. There is no difference between the logic of the two statements.
Note 71. Phil answers my question “On what grounds then, should the state restrict marriage to only two people?” with:
So there is no reason to maintain monogamous marriage other than the procedural hassles that a change to multiple partner marriages would entail?
The (rightful) dropping of the prohibition maintained marriage as a heterosexual, monogamous union. You are asking for something else entirely.
No, but your question is revealing. Those are actually two separate issues–maintaining monogamous marriage is one thing, and creating a new legal system for multiple partner marriage is a second thing. Creating multiple-partner marriage does not necessarily obliterate monogamous marriage as a legal structure (unless that’s part of your legislation?).
So, the reasons not to pass new legislation are not necessarily the same as the reasons to maintain existing legislation.
More importantly, my response in note 70 is pretty obviously not the sum total of all possible arguments against polygamy. Rather, you are presenting hypothetical legislation and you are asking me to oppose it. My response is that procedural issues plague your hypothetical legislation, and that it therefore cannot pass.
In other words, in asking my reasons for opposing a legal change, you must be specific about the legal change you are presenting. You have not met your prima facie burden to present a change to the status quo. The merits of your plan cannot be discussed because you haven’t presented a plan.
Another example of this would be if you asked me whether I oppose “killing.” I could be imprecise and say “Sure, I oppose killing,” but it would be meaningless unless I really understood what you are presenting. Do you mean animals? People? Self-defense? Etc.
This is not to say that I am leaving the door open for the possibility of a workable system of polygamy, just that the different possible systems would probably be unworkable for different reasons. (For example, if a man has three wives, and one of the wives has three husbands, are the husbands all married to each other, or are those separate marriages? What if one of Wife B’s husbands wants to marry Wife C also? Which husband gets power of attorney? How would their divorces take effect? Etc.) You will note that none of those questions has a f*%$#!@ thing to do with same-sex marriage, as you keep implying over and over.
However, to respond to the spirit of your post, I’ll say–why can’t polygamy be opposed because it creates procedural hassles that cannot be overcome? It seems like you are again suggesting that legal issues should not be determined by legalities. Civil marriage is a contract, and if a contract is unenforceable, that is the primary reason against it. The state should only concern itself with the legal issues of a proposition; the spiritual issues are best left to individuals.
You have responded with a non sequitur. Yes, of course same-sex marriage is not identical to mixed-race marriage, but the statement that “All men have a right to marry” employs identical logic to the statement “All white women had a right to marry in the pre-civil rights era.” Both statements are true, would you agree?
Note 73. Phil responds to my question: “So there is no reason to maintain monogamous marriage other than the procedural hassles that a change to multiple partner marriages would entail?” with:
I will write more later but what was I saying about no presumption of monogamy in the homosexual replication of heterosexual marriage? Homosexual marriage is in fact a radical redefinition of heterosexual marriage, not the logical extension of it.
Yes. Both are true. It’s men marrying men that is the novelty. The prohibition against same-sex marriage is true in both cases as well.