From “Best of the Web” newsletter JAMES TARANTO

Much of the conservative commentary about Monday’s filibuster deal has been along the lines of this Thomas Sowell column:

The Senate Democrats hung tough and the Republicans wimped out. The Republicans had the votes but they didn’t have the guts.

That is the bottom line on the compromise agreement that will allow votes to proceed on judicial nominees without a filibuster, except in “extraordinary” cases. In other words, the Democrats will filibuster only when they feel like filibustering, since they will define what “extraordinary” means to them.

This seems a rather obvious misreading of what happened, doesn’t it? True, seven Republicans broke from their party in agreeing to abjure the “nuclear option,” but seven Democrats also broke from theirs to allow votes on at least three nominees whom fellow Dems had spent years smearing as “extremist” and “out of the mainstream.” And since the Senate has fewer Democrats than Republicans, the Democrats are actually the more divided party: 15.6% of Dems joined the compromise, vs. just 12.7% of Republicans.

What’s more, at least three of the compromising Republicans–Mike DeWine, Lindsey Graham and John Warner–have publicly expressed a willingness to “go nuclear” should the Democrats act in bad faith in filibustering a nominee.

To our mind, though, the biggest misconception in Sowell’s analysis is the assumption that the Democrats filibuster because “they feel like filibustering.” The Dems’ use of the filibuster was political, not recreational–a strategy that was at least plausible when they adopted it, but that proved disastrous.

The Democrats didn’t begin using the filibuster right away when President Bush took office; they didn’t need to. In 2001-02, after Jim Jeffords switched parties, the Democrats held a majority and were able to stop judges via party-line vote in the Judiciary Committee. The Republicans’ two-seat net gain in the 2002 election gave the GOP the majority, whereupon the Democrats began employing the filibuster in 2003-04. In doing so, they showed an impressive unity. For once they actually seemed like an organized political party.

But the filibuster strategy was based on political assumptions that turned out to be faulty. In 2003-04, Senate Democrats thought they were running out the clock on a one-term president. Their plan for the 109th Congress was for Majority Leader Tom Daschle to shepherd through President Kerry’s judicial nominees.

Instead, President Bush won re-election, and the Republicans won eight of nine contested Senate races. John Kerry* is still a senator, and Tom Daschle isn’t. And the only Democrat to win a close Senate race, Ken Salazar of Colorado, said during his campaign that he opposed the judicial filibuster. Not surprisingly, Salazar was one of the seven compromising Democrats.

Did the Democrats really want to go through all this again? Well, some no doubt did. Hate is more important than success to the likes of Barbara Boxer and Ted Kennedy, and in any case senators from liberal states are unlikely to pay a price for obstructionism. But the filibuster strategy runs counter to the inclinations and political interests of a substantial minority of Democrats, including, as we noted yesterday, at least five of the seven compromisers.

From where we sit, then, the actions of the Republican compromisers look like not a capitulation but a way of letting Democrats back down from a losing position without being humiliated.

Why not humiliate the Democrats? Well, here’s one reason: “Democrats agreed on Tuesday to clear the way for the Senate to vote on the controversial nomination of John Bolton as the next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, which was expected to pass mainly on party lines,” Reuters reports. Had the Senate gone nuclear yesterday, Bolton’s nomination would be suffering from the fallout.

* The haughty, French-looking Massachusetts Democrat, who by the way promised 115 days ago to release his military records.